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Self-contradictory Reasoning
Jan Ekman
Abstract This paper concerns the characterization of paradoxical reasoning in terms
of structures of proofs. The starting point is the observation that many paradoxes use
self-reference to give a statement a double meaning and that this double meaning
results in a contradiction. Continuing by constraining the concept of meaning by the
inferences of a derivation “self-contradictory reasoning” is formalized as reasoning
with statements that have a double meaning, or equivalently, cannot be given any
meaning. The “meanings” derived this way are global for the argument as a whole.
That is, they are not only constraints for each separate inference step of the argument.
It is shown that the basic examples of paradoxes, the liar paradox and Russell’s
paradox, are self-contradictory. Self-contradiction is not only a structure of paradoxes
but is found also in proofs using self-reference. Self-contradiction is formalized in
natural deduction systems for naïve set theory, and it is shown that self-contradiction
is related to normalization. Non-normalizable deductions are self-contradictory.
Keywords Paradox · Proof structure · Self-contradiction · Proof theory · Russell’s
paradox
1 Introduction
Let us consider Russell’s paradox:
Let t be the set of all sets not containing themselves. Assume that t contains itself. Hence, by
the definition of t , t does not contain itself. This contradicts the assumption that t contains
itself and hence t does not contain itself. Since t does not contain itself, it follows from the
definition of t that t contains itself. This is a contradiction.
This article is based on Chap. 5 of the author’s PhD thesis; see Ekman (1994) [2]. Definitions of
elementary notions can be found in the Appendix below.
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Let us take a closer look at the part of Russell’s paradox that proves that t does
not contain itself. Let ER be this part of Russell’s paradox. We observe that the
assumption that t contains itself is used twice in ER . We shall now distinguish
the use of an assumption from how it is used. Let us therefore, to express that an
assumption is used in an argument, say that the assumption occurs in an argument.
Thus there are two occurrences of the assumption that t contains itself in ER . One
of these two occurrences of the assumption that t contains itself is used together
with the definition of t to derive that t does not contain itself. To contradict this
last proposition the other occurrence of the assumption that t contains itself is used.
Hence, there are two occurrences of the assumption that t contains itself in ER ,
and they are used in such a way that they contradict each other. In the last step of
ER , the conclusion that t does not contain itself is drawn from the contradiction
that the assumption that t contains itself leads to. In a sense the two occurrences of
the assumption that t contains itself are identified in this step. Considering the two
occurrences of the assumption that t contains itself as one and the same proposition,
we have that there in ER is a proposition which is used in two ways and that the two
ways of using the proposition are incompatible.
A self-contradictory argument is, informally, an argument, as ER above, in which
there is a proposition which is used in two or more ways such that not all of the ways
of using the proposition are compatible. In this article we aim to make those ideas
more precise and formally express the notion of self-contradictory reasoning in some
formal systems.
2 Meaning Conditions
The notion of a self-contradictory argument as introduced in the previous section is
based on “the way in which a proposition is used in an argument.” In this section we
aim at making it more precise what we mean by this, and we will outline how the
notion of a self-contradictory argument will be formally expressed in the succeed-
ing sections. Given an argument and a proposition of this argument we shall in the
following consider the meaning forced on the proposition, by the steps of the argu-
ment. The meaning forced on a proposition, by the steps of the argument, expresses
precisely the way in which the proposition is used in the argument.
Let us consider an example. Let D be the following argument: The wind is blowing
because it’s snowing and the wind is blowing. Let A be the proposition it’s snowing
and the wind is blowing and let B be the proposition the wind is blowing. Thus D
consists of one step and A and B are the premise and the conclusion, respectively,
of this step. If we forget about which propositions A and B represent we still know
something about them by remembering what kind of step the inference of D is. That
is, knowing only that the inference of D is of the kind that informally corresponds
to one of the &E inference schemata in natural deduction for naïve set theory N (see
Appendix below), we know that since A is the premise of the step, A is A1 and A2
for some propositions A1 and A2. Moreover, if A is A1 and A2 then B is A2. The
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meaning forced on the propositions A and B by the inference of D is this knowledge
about A and B given by the knowledge about what kind of step the inference of D
is. Hence the meaning of the meaning forced on the proposition, by the steps of the
argument depends on what is considered to be known, when knowing only what kind
of steps the steps of the argument are.
In the previous section, “a self-contradictory argument” was explained to be an
argument in which there is a proposition which is used in two or more ways such
that not all of the ways of using the proposition are compatible. In this section “the
meaning forced on a proposition, by the steps of the argument” expresses precisely
the way in which the proposition is used in the argument. Hence, we can explain
what “a self-contradictory argument” is by saying that it is an argument such that
the steps of the argument force several meanings on one of the propositions of the
argument and that not all of these meanings are compatible. Yet another way to put
this is to say that an argument is self-contradictory if and only if the steps of the
argument force an ambiguous meaning on one of the propositions of the argument.
Note that, as is clear from the example above, the meaning forced on a proposition
by an argument is not an interpretation of the proposition but a constraint on how it
may be interpreted.
Now we change to how to formally express “a self-contradictory argument.” Let
us by the meaning of a proposition mean an interpretation of the proposition. For
instance, the wind is blowing is the meaning of the proposition B in the example
above. Let A be a formula occurrence in a deduction in some formal system. To
denote that A has a certain meaning, m say, we decorate A with m. More precisely,
we shall write m : A to denote that A has the meaning m. We use these decorations
to define meaning conditions. Meaning conditions are formal representations of the
constraints given by the meaning forced on a proposition by an argument. For every
formal system considered in this article we shall do the following. We shall define
what the set of formal meanings is for decorating the formulas in deductions in
the formal system and we shall give the meaning conditions associated with the
formal system. Thus, through the meaning conditions we formally define what is
informally described by “the way in which a proposition is used in an argument.” By
an assignment of meanings to the formulas in a deduction we mean a decoration of
all of the formulas in the deduction. That a meaning is assigned to a formula means
that the formula has been decorated with the meaning. The meaning conditions are
given as constraints on the decorations, by formal meanings, of the formulas in the
deductions. As an example let us consider, in the formal system N, a deduction
consisting of an ⊃E inference, α say. Let X , Y and Z be the major premise, the
minor premise and the conclusion, respectively, of α. Let mx , my and mz denote
some meanings assigned to X , Y and Z , respectively. We decorate the formulas in
the deduction as follows.




Reasoning in the same way as in the previous example, we know that since X is
the major premise of an ⊃E inference, X must be X1 ⊃ X2 for some propositions
X1 and X2. We express this constraint by requiring the meaning mx to be m ⇒ n for
some meanings m and n, where thus ⇒ means “implies that.” Moreover we require
my to be m and mz to be n. Thus, mx may not be it’s snowing and the wind is blowing.
However my may be it’s snowing and the wind is blowing and mz may be the wind
is blowing. In this case mx must be it’s snowing and the wind is blowing implies that
the wind is blowing. We express meaning conditions given for any ⊃E inference in
any deduction in the formal system N by the schema
D
m ⇒ n : A
E
m : B ⊃E
n : C
Hence the meaning condition for the major premise A of an ⊃E inference is that A
must have the meaning m ⇒ n for some meanings m and n. Moreover, the meanings
of the major premise, the minor premise and the conclusion respectively must have
the relation to each other expressed by the schema. The notion of a self-contradictory
deduction in a formal system is defined as follows.
Definition 1 Assume that F is a formal system. Assume that the set of formal mean-
ings for decorating the formulas in the deductions in F are defined, and assume that
the meaning conditions associated with the formal system are given in some way.
Then a deduction D in F is self-contradictory if there is no assignment of formal
meanings to the formulas in D such that this assignment satisfies the meaning con-
ditions.
The meaning conditions, as we shall give them, are related to the inversion prin-
ciple of Prawitz. In Prawitz (1965) [6] we can read the following.
Observe that an elimination rule is, in a sense, the inverse of the corresponding introduction
rule: by an application of an elimination rule one essentially only restores what had already
been established if the major premise of the application was inferred by an application of an
introduction rule.
We may say that, for a given deduction, the constraint expressed by the meaning
conditions is an attempt to make the inversion principle global, in the deduction. But
this attempt is successful if and only if the deduction is not self-contradictory, since
otherwise there is no assignment of formal meanings to the formulas in the deduction
such that this assignment satisfies the meaning conditions.
The Curry-Howard interpretation may resemble what designates meanings in
the meaning conditions. However, the similarity is only superficial. In general, it
is not the case that the assignment of Curry-Howard interpretations to the formula
occurrences in a deduction satisfies the meaning conditions. Since the Curry-Howard
interpretation is just a representation of an argument, there are always Curry-Howard
interpretations of the formula occurrences in a deduction, but there need not be
an assignment of formal meanings to the formulas in the deduction such that this
assignment satisfies the meaning conditions.
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3 The Liar Paradox
In this section we shall study the liar paradox as an example of a self-contradictory
argument. The liar paradox is the following.
Let P be the sentence “This sentence is false.” That is, P is the sentence “P is false.”
Assume P . Hence, by the definition of P , P is false. This contradicts the assumption P , and
hence P is false. Since P is false, P follows from the definition of P . This is a contradiction.
This argument is very similar to Russell’s paradox. Below we present the formal
system FP, specially designed for a formal presentation of the liar paradox. The
language of FP is the set of formulas, where ⊥ and P are formulas, and if A and B
are formulas, then A ⊃ B is a formula; ¬A is defined to be A ⊃ ⊥. The inference

























PE¬P [P] ⊃E⊥ ⊃I¬P
The set of formal meanings to be assigned to formulas in deductions in the formal
system FP is inductively defined as follows. The meaning variable x is a meaning,
and if m and n are meanings, then pm and m ⇒ n are meanings. We may interpret
the meanings as follows: m ⇒ n means “m implies that n,” and pm means “This
sentence is false,” where “This” refers to the sentence expressed by m. The meaning
conditions associated with the formal system FP are the following.
D







n : B ⊃I
m ⇒ n : A ⊃ B
D
m ⇒ n : A ⊃ B
E
m : A ⊃E
n : B
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Now assume that there is an assignment of formal meanings to the formulas in
the deduction F above such that this assignment satisfies the meaning conditions.
Assume that m is the meaning of the minor premise P of the ⊃E inference and that
n is the meaning of the conclusion ⊥ of the ⊃E inference. Then, by the conditions
above we conclude that the meaning of the premise P of the PE inference must be
p(m ⇒ n).
[p(m ⇒ n) : P]
PE
m ⇒ n : ¬P [m : P] ⊃E





The condition given for the ⊃I inference schema requires both of the formulas can-
celled at the ⊃I inference in F to have the same meaning. However, no matter how
we choose m and n the meanings m and p(m ⇒ n) are not the same. Hence, there
is no assignment of formal meanings to the formulas in F such that this assignment
satisfies the meaning conditions. Hence, F is self-contradictory.
4 Self-contradictory Reasoning in N−∀∃=
Let N−∀∃= be the fragment of N obtained by removing the symbols ∀, ∃ and = and
the inference schemata corresponding to these symbols from N. In this section we
shall study the notion of self-contradictory deductions in the formal system N−∀∃=.
We shall also prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Every non-self-contradictory deduction in N−∀∃= is normalizable.
In this section and the two succeeding ones we shall use the terminology of Ekman
(1994) [2, Sect. 3.1], see Appendix below. Hence, by “normalizable” in Theorem 1
we mean normalizable as defined in Ekman (1994) [2, Sect. 3.1], see Appendix below.
As in the formal system FP, m and n denote meanings.
Assume that A is a formula such that there is no normal proof of A in N−∀∃=.
Then, by Proposition 3.1.4 in Ekman (1994) [2] there is no normalizable proof of A
in N−∀∃=. Hence by Theorem 1 every proof of A is self-contradictory. Since there
is no normal proof of ⊥ in N−∀∃= it follows that every paradox in N−∀∃= is self-
contradictory, if by paradox we mean a proof of ⊥. In Ekman (1994) [2, Sect. 2.1]
it is shown that there is no normal proof of the formula t /∈ u, where t is the term
defined by
t ≡ {x | x ∈ u & x /∈ x}
Hence, every proof of t /∈ u in N−∀∃= is self-contradictory. In Ekman (1994) [2,
Sect. 2.1] also a proof, named Crabbe’s counterexample (see Crabbé (1974) [1]), of
the formula t /∈ u is presented. This proof is a proof in N−∀∃= and hence Crabbe’s
counterexample is a self-contradictory proof. It is also argued in Ekman (1994) [2,
Sect. 2.1] that Crabbe’s counterexample expresses a correct argument in ZF. Hence
Self-contradictory Reasoning 217
the formula t /∈ u, or the proposition that informally corresponds to t /∈ u, serves as
an example of a proposition provable in ZF, but only by self-contradictory proofs,
unless we use proof principles not expressible in N−∀∃=.
The variables of the language of N−∀∃= will also be used to denote meaning
variables. The set of formal meanings to be assigned to formulas in deductions in
the formal system N−∀∃= is inductively defined as follows. The meaning variable
x and false are meanings, and if m and n are meanings, then m, m ⇒ n, m ∧ n
and m + n are meanings. The meaning conditions associated with the formal system
N−∀∃= are the following.
D
m : A[t/x] ∈I
m : t ∈ {x | A}
D
m : t ∈ {x | A} ∈E
m : A[t/x]
D




n : B ⊃I
m ⇒ n : A ⊃ B
D
m ⇒ n : A ⊃ B
E





n : B &I
m ∧ n : A & B
D
m ∧ n : A & B &E1
m : A
D
m ∧ n : A & B &E2
n : B
D
m : A ∨I
m + n : A ∨ B
D
n : B ∨I
m + n : A ∨ B
D






n : C ∨E
n : C
Let D and E be two deductions in N−∀∃= such that D is non-self-contradictory,
θ is an assignment of formal meanings to the formula occurrences in D such that
this assignment satisfies the meaning conditions and D =⇒ E (i.e., D reduces to E ;
see Appendix for the definition of reductions of deductions). Then we let a(θ,E ,D)
denote the assignment of formal meanings to the formula occurrences in E given by
considering every formula occurrence in E to correspond to a formula occurrence in
D and assigning the same meaning to the formula occurrence in E as the meaning
assigned to the corresponding formula occurrence in D . If D reduces to E via an
epsilon reduction, then the deduction D , with its formula occurrences decorated by
θ has the form
F
m : A[t/x] ∈I



















If D reduces to E via an imply reduction, then D , with its formula occurrences
decorated by θ , has the form
[m : A]
F
n : B ⊃I
m ⇒ n : A ⊃ B
G



















For all other cases of the kind of reduction that takes D to E , a(θ,E ,D) is defined
similarly.
Lemma 1 If a deduction D is non-self-contradictory and D reduces to E , then also
the deduction E is non-self-contradictory.
Proof Let θ be an assignment of formal meanings to the formula occurrences in
D such that this assignment satisfies the meaning conditions. Then a(θ,E ,D) is
an assignment of formal meanings to the formula occurrences in E such that this
assignment satisfies the meaning conditions. 
Let the formal system P of propositional logic be given as in the Appendix below.
We assume that there is at least one propositional variable P in the language of P.
Let ∗ be the function from the set of meanings to be assigned to formulas in deductions




(m)∗ ≡ (⊥ ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ m∗
(m ⇒ n)∗ ≡ m∗ ⊃ n∗
(m ∧ n)∗ ≡ m∗ & n∗
(m + n)∗ ≡ m∗ ∨ n∗
We extend ∗ to a function from the set of sets of meanings to be assigned to formulas
in deductions in the formal system N−∀∃= onto the set of sets of formulas of P by
letting Γ ∗ denote the set of formulas A∗ such that A belongs to Γ , for all sets of
meanings to be assigned to formulas in deductions in the formal system N−∀∃=.
We extend ∗ once more, to a function from the set of non-self-contradictory
deductions in N−∀∃= to the set of deductions in P. If D is a deduction in N−∀∃=




m : A[t/x] ∈I







(⊥ ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ m∗
Observe that there is no open assumption of the form ⊥ ⊃ ⊥ in D∗, cancelled at the











(⊥ ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ m∗
[⊥] ⊃I⊥ ⊃ ⊥ ⊃E
m∗
For all other cases of the end inference of a deduction D , the definition of D∗
commutes with the definition of deduction. For instance, for the case that an ⊃I is
the last inference of a deduction, we have the following clause defining the image






n : B ⊃I










Proposition 1 Assume that D is a non-self-contradictory deduction, θ is an assign-
ment of formal meanings to the formula occurrences in D such that this assignment
satisfies the meaning conditions and D =⇒ E . Let D also denote the deduction
obtained from D by decorating the formula occurrences in D with θ . Let E also
denote the deduction obtained from E by decorating the formula occurrences in E
with a(θ,E ,D). Then D∗ =⇒ E ∗.
Since P is strongly normalizable (see Prawitz (1965) [6]), we have Theorem 1 as
a consequence of Proposition 1.
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5 Self-contradictory Reasoning in N−∃=
Under the assumption that meaning conditions formally express the way in which
a proposition is used, as outlined in Sect. 2, it is a bit more complicated to define
the meaning conditions associated with a formal system with quantifiers than it is
to define the meaning conditions associated with a quantifier-free formal system. In
this section we shall study the notion of self-contradictory deductions in the formal
system N−∃=, which is the fragment of N obtained by removing the symbols ∃ and
= and the inference schemata corresponding to these symbols from N. We shall also
prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Every non-self-contradictory deduction in N−∃= is normalizable.
Let A be any formula. To define the meaning conditions associated with the formal
system N−∃= we shall informally consider ∀x A to represent the informally given
infinitely long formula A[t1/x] & (A[t2/x] & (A[t3/x] & . . .)), where t1, t2, t3, . . .
are all terms of the formal system N−∃=.
A naïve way to give the meaning conditions associated with N−∃= is to add the
following meaning conditions to the meaning conditions associated with N−∀∃=,
where λ is assumed to have been added to the constructors of the syntax defining
what the set of formal meanings to be assigned to formulas in deductions is, such
that λm is a meaning for any meaning m.
D
m : A ∀I
λm : ∀x A
D
λm : ∀x A ∀E
m : A[t/x]
With meaning conditions given this way, we require that there is a one to one cor-
respondence between the meaning of the premise and the conclusion both for ∀I
inferences and for ∀E inferences. This condition is however too strong, if we con-
sider ∀x A to represent the informally given infinitely long formula above, since the
meaning conditions given for &E inferences does not require that there is a one to
one correspondence between the meaning of the premise and the conclusion of an
&E inference. As an example, consider the following deduction.
[r ∈ {y | A} & (r ∈ {y | ¬A} & C)]
&E
r ∈ {y | ¬A} & C
&E
r ∈ {y | ¬A} ∈E¬A[r/y]
[r ∈ {y | A} & (r ∈ {y | ¬A} & C)]
&E
r ∈ {y | A} ∈EA[r/y] ⊃E⊥ ⊃I¬(r ∈ {y | A} & (r ∈ {y | ¬A} & C))
This deduction is non-self-contradictory independently of which formulas A and
C are. It is straightforward to assign meanings to the formula occurrences of the
deduction above such that this assignment satisfies the meaning conditions. Assume
that C is ∀x(r ∈ x) and let us consider C to represent the informally given formula
(r ∈ t1)& ((r ∈ t2)& ((r ∈ t3)& . . .)), where t1, t2, t3, . . . are all terms of the formal
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system N−∃=. Then r ∈ {y | A} & (r ∈ {y | ¬A} & C) and C informally represent
the same formula. We have the following proof of ¬C , which from an informal point
of view is another presentation of the deduction above.
[∀x(r ∈ x)] ∀E
r ∈ {y | ¬A} ∈E¬A[r/y]
[∀x(r ∈ x)] ∀E
r ∈ {y | A} ∈EA[r/y] ⊃E⊥ ⊃I¬∀x(r ∈ x)
This deduction is self-contradictory if the meaning conditions are given as above.
We suggest the following definition of meaning conditions associated with the
formal system N−∃=. The set of formal meanings to be assigned to formulas in
deductions in the formal system N−∃= is inductively defined as follows. The meaning
variable x and false are meanings, and if m and n are meanings, then m, m ⇒ n,
m ∧n, m +n and λx .m are meanings. The meaning conditions are the following and
in addition the meaning conditions associated with the formal system N−∀∃=.
D
m : A ∀I
λx .m : ∀x A
D
λx .m : ∀x A ∀E
m[n/x] : A[t/x]
We have the restriction on the meaning variable, designated x , in the ∀I meaning
condition schema that it may not occur free in any meaning assigned to an open
assumption in D . This restriction excludes, for instance, the following decoration of
a deduction.
λy.x : ∀y(r ∈ y) ∀Ex : r ∈ x ∀I
λx .x : ∀x(r ∈ x)
Remember that the aim is to define the meaning conditions so that the meaning
conditions express a constraint given by the meaning forced on a proposition given
by an argument, in the sense of Sect. 2. Remember also that the meaning forced on
a proposition given by an argument is arbitrary so far as what is considered to be
known is arbitrary, when knowing only what kind of steps the steps of the argument
are. We do not claim that the meaning conditions given are the only possible. The
given meaning conditions express constraints which we judge as accurate.
We have chosen the constraint defined by the meaning conditions to be no more
restrictive than what is necessary to prove Theorem 2. There are however reasons to
consider further restrictions on the meaning conditions. Consider the deduction
m1 : A ∀I
λx .x : ∀x A ∀E
m2 : A
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Assume that x does not occur free in A. Then the constraint defined by the meaning
conditions can be strengthened so that m2 and m1 are required to be syntactically
equal. More generally, if x occurs free in A we can strengthen the constraint defined
by the meaning conditions so that, in an informal sense, if one “submeaning” of
m2 and one “submeaning” of m1 “correspond” to the same subformula of A, and
x does not occur free in this subformula, then these “submeanings” of m1 and m2,
respectively, are required to be syntactically equal.
In the following we shall not assume this last restriction to be added. Of course,
if Theorem 2 holds without this restriction added to the restrictions of the meaning
conditions, then this theorem also is true with this restriction added.
All meaning condition schemata except the ⊥E meaning condition schema define
a relation between the meanings assigned to the premises and the conclusion of the
inference. We can interpret this as follows: use of the ⊥E inference schema says that
nothing more is known about how the premise of an ⊥E inference is derived other
than that it is the premise of an ⊥E inference. Instead of having ⊥ primitively given
in N we can define it by ∀x(r ∈ x), where r is an arbitrary term. We then have the
⊥E inference schema as a derived schema, derived as follows, where x is supposed
to be chosen so that x does not occur free in A.
λx .x : ∀x(r ∈ x) ∀E
m : r ∈ {x | A} ∈E
m : A
Then if we also take false to be defined by λx .x we have the ⊥E meaning condition
schema as a derived meaning condition schema, derived from the meaning condition
schemata ∀E and ∈E.
Lemma 2 If a deduction D is non-self-contradictory and D reduces to E then also
the deduction E is non-self-contradictory.
The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. To prove Theorem 1
we define a function ∗ from the set of non-self-contradictory deductions in N−∀∃= to
the set of deductions in P. To prove Theorem 2 we shall instead defined a function
∗ from the set of non-self-contradictory deductions in N−∃= to the set of deductions
in P2, where P2 denotes the formal system of second order propositional logic. The
language of P2 is the set of formulas, inductively defined as follows. The propositional
variables X, X1, X2, . . . and ⊥ are formulas, and if A and B are formulas, then A⊃B,
A & B, A ∨ B and ∀X A are formulas. The ⊥,⊃, & and ∨ inference schemata are





∀X A ∀EA[B/X ]
We have the restriction on deductions in P2 that the variable designated X in
the ∀I schema may not occur free in any open assumption in the deduction desig-
nated D . The reduction rules for deductions in P2 are the same as the reduction
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rules for deductions in N−∃= except that the substitution of a term for a variable in
the ∀-reduction in N−∃= corresponds, in P2, to a substitution of a proposition for
a propositional variable. We presuppose that the set of variables of N−∃= and the
set of propositional variables of P2 have the same cardinality. Hence there is a one
to one correspondence, ∗ say, between the set of variables of N−∃= and the set of
propositional variables of P2. For any variable x of N−∃= we let the propositional
variable X of P2 denote x∗. The function ∗ from the set of meanings to be assigned
to formulas in deductions in the formal system N−∃= onto the set of formulas of P2
is defined as follows.
x∗ ≡ X
false ≡ ⊥
(m)∗ ≡ (⊥ ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ m∗
(m ⇒ n)∗ ≡ m∗ ⊃ n∗
(m ∧ n)∗ ≡ m∗ & n∗
(m + n)∗ ≡ m∗ ∨ n∗
(λx .m)∗ ≡ ∀Xm∗
The function ∗ is extended to a function from the set of sets of meanings to be assigned
to formulas in deductions in the formal system N−∃= onto the set of sets of formulas
of P2 by letting Γ ∗ denote the set of formulas A∗ such that A belongs to Γ , for all
sets Γ of meanings to be assigned to formulas in deductions in the formal system
N−∃=. In a similar way as in Sect. 4 we extend ∗ once more, to a function from the
set of non-self-contradictory deductions in N−∃= to the set of deductions in P2. To




m : A ∀I














The definition of a(θ,E ,D), given in Sect. 4, extends from deductions in N−∀∃=
to deductions in N−∃= by defining a(θ,E ,D) also in the case D reduces to E via
an ∀ reduction. This is done in a similar way as for the other cases of the kind of
reduction that takes D to E .
Proposition 2 Assume that D is a non-self-contradictory deduction, θ is an assign-
ment of formal meanings to the formula occurrences in D such that this assignment
satisfies the meaning conditions and D =⇒ E . Let D also denote the deduction
obtained from D by decorating the formula occurrences in D with θ . Let E also
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denote the deduction obtained from E by decorating the formula occurrences in E
with a(θ,E ,D). Then D∗ =⇒ E ∗.
From Girard (1971) [4] it is known that deductions in P2 are strongly normalizable;
see also Martin-Löf (1971) [5]. From this together with Proposition 2, Theorem 2
follows.
6 Self-contradictory Reasoning in N−=
The meaning conditions associated with N−= are defined by adding to the meaning
conditions associated with N−∃= some constraints given by informally considering
∃x A to represent the informally given infinitely long formula A[t1/x] ∨ (A[t2/x] ∨
(A[t3/x]∨. . .)), where t1, t2, t3, . . . are all terms of the formal system N−=. The set of
formal meanings to be assigned to formulas in deductions in the formal system N−=
is inductively defined as follows. The meaning variable x and false are meanings,
and if m and n are meanings, then m, m ⇒ n, m ∧n, λx .m and μx .m are meanings.
The meaning conditions associated with the formal system N−= are the following,
and in addition the meaning conditions associated with the formal system N−∃=.
D
m[n/x] : A[t/x] ∃I
μx .m : ∃x A
D
μx .m : ∃x A
[m : A]
E
n : C ∃E
n : C
We have the restriction on the meaning variable designated x in the ∃E meaning
condition schema that neither may it occur free in the meaning designated n assigned
to the subsequent premise of the ∃E nor may it occur free in any meaning assigned
to an open assumption of the deduction of the subsequent premise E other than the
open assumption designated A.
Theorem 3 Every non-self-contradictory deduction in N−= is normalizable.
Let PR be the formal system with the same language as N−=, obtained by remov-
ing the ∈-inferences from N. We have the following result concerning PR.
Proposition 3 Every deduction in PR is non-self-contradictory.
Proof Let D be any given deduction in PR. We shall define an assignment of for-
mal meanings to the formulas in D such that this assignment satisfies the meaning
conditions. This assignment is defined by decorating every formula occurrence A in
D with the formal meaning A◦, where ◦ is a function from the set of formulas of PR
to the set of formal meanings to be assigned to formulas in deductions in the formal
system N−=. The bijection ◦ is defined as follows.
(r ∈ x)◦ ≡ x
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(r ∈ {x | A})◦ ≡  A◦
⊥◦ ≡ false
(A ⊃ B)◦ ≡ A◦ ⇒ B◦
(A & B)◦ ≡ A◦ ∧ B◦
(A ∨ B)◦ ≡ A◦ + B◦
(∀x A)◦ ≡ λx .A◦
(∃x A)◦ ≡ μx .A◦ 
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
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Appendix
Naïve Set Theory
We present the system N of natural deduction for naïve set theory. The syntactic
categories of the language of N are
1. Variables, x, y, z
2. Terms, r, s, t, u, v, w
3. Formulas, A, B, C, . . .
The language of N is the set of terms and formulas, inductively defined as follows.
Variables x , y and z are terms, and if A is a formula, then {x | A} is a term. If r
and s are terms, then r = s and r ∈ s are formulas, and if A and B are formulas,
then A ⊃ B, A & B, ∀x A, A ∨ B and ∃x A are formulas; ⊥ is also a formula. The
symbols used in the language of a formal system are the primitive symbols of that
formal system. In addition to the primitive symbols of N, we shall use the following
defined symbols
¬A ≡ A ⊃ ⊥
r /∈ s ≡ ¬(r ∈ s)
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An inference is an application of an inference schema. An atomic formula is a
formula that cannot be the conclusion of an introduction inference. In an elimination
inference the leftmost premise is the major premise and all other premises, if there
are any, are the minor premises. A proof is a deduction without open assumptions.
A subdeduction is defined to be an occurrence of a subdeduction in a deduction.
The variable x in the ∀I and ∃E schemata and the variables x and y in the =I
schema designate eigenvariables of inferences. We require that the eigenvariables
occurring in a deduction D are syntactically distinguished from each other and from
variables with free non-eigenvariable occurrences in D .
For a treatment of the basic concepts of natural deduction the reader is referred
to Gentzen (1969) [3] and Prawitz (1965, 1971) [6, 7].
Self-contradictory Reasoning 227
Normal Deductions in a Fragment of N
Let F be a formal system. We consider a fragment of F to be a formal system
obtained from F by removing some primitive symbols and the corresponding infer-
ence schemata. To begin with we look at normal deductions in the formal system
obtained by removing the symbols ∃, ∨ and = and the inference schemata corre-
sponding to these symbols from N. We let N−∃∨= denote this formal system.
In addition to the uniqueness of names of eigenvariables we have restrictions on
deductions concerning the scopes of eigenvariables. The scope of an eigenvariable
in a deduction D is the subdeduction of D in which the eigenvariable is defined.
The scope of an eigenvariable of an ∀I inference is the premise deduction of the
inference. We have the restriction on deductions that an eigenvariable of an inference
may not occur free in any open assumption in the scope of the eigenvariable other
than assumptions cancelled at the inference.
Definition 2 In N−∃∨= a cut is formula occurrence which is both the conclusion
of an introduction inference and the major premise of an elimination inference. A
normal deduction is a deduction containing no cut.
Definition 3 A branch in a deduction D is a sequence A1, A2, . . . , An of formula
occurrences in D such that: (1) A1 is an assumption. (2) For each i such that 1 ≤
i < n, Ai stands immediately above Ai+1 and Ai is not the minor premise of an
elimination inference. (3) An is the end formula of the deduction or the minor premise
of an elimination inference. An E-part of a branch is a sequence of consecutive
formulas of the branch, none of which is the conclusion of an introduction inference.
An I -part of a branch is a sequence of consecutive formulas of the branch, all of
which are the conclusions of introduction inferences. A main branch is a branch
A1, A2, . . . , An , with An as the end formula of the deduction. An E-main branch is
a main branch consisting only of an E-part. Note that there cannot be more than one
E-main branch in a deduction.
If a formula occurrence in a deduction in N−∃∨= is a minor premise of an elimina-
tion inference then this formula occurrence is the minor premise of an ⊃E inference.
The reason that the phrase the minor premise of an elimination inference is used in
the definition of a branch above is to make the definition applicable to deductions in
other formal systems, where it is not the case that a minor premise of an elimination
inference always is the minor premise of an ⊃E inference.
Proposition 4 Every branch in a normal deduction in N−∃∨= consists of an E-part
followed by a (possibly empty) I -part.
Proposition 5 A normal proof in N−∃∨= has an introduction inference as its last
inference.
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Reductions of Deductions in N−=
We use D =⇒ E to denote that D reduces to the deduction E . If there is a deduction
E such that D =⇒ E then D is reducible. D reduces in zero steps to itself. If there
are deductions E1, . . . ,En , where n ≥ 1, such that
D =⇒ E1 =⇒ . . . =⇒ En
then D reduces in n steps to the deduction En . Hence, the two phrases D reduces in
one step to E and D reduces to E have the same meaning. If there is an n ≥ 0 and a
deduction E such that D reduces in n steps to E , and E is not reducible, then D is
normalizable. If there is no infinite family {Ei }, i = 1, 2, 3, . . . of deductions such
that D =⇒ E1 and Ei =⇒ Ei+1, for i ≥ 1, then D is strongly normalizable.
The relation =⇒ is defined inductively, by the schemata below. Notice that a
deduction is reducible only if it has a cut and that the reduction defined removes the
cut.
Epsilon reduction Imply reduction
D
A[t/x] ∈I
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=⇒ DA
D
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=⇒ EB
D
























A ∀I∀x A ∀EA[t/x]
=⇒ D[t/x]
A[t/x]




Propositional logic is the formal system P obtained by removing the symbols ∈,∀, ∃
and= and the inference schemata corresponding to these symbols from N. The formal
system P does not have any term variables but instead propositional variables. The
language of P is the set of formulas, inductively defined as follows. The propositional
variables P, Q, R and ⊥ are formulas, and if A and B are formulas, then A ⊃ B,
A & B and A ∨ B are formulas.
A branch in a deduction in P is defined as a branch in a deduction in N−∃∨=.
The notion of a cut in a deduction in P and the notion of a normal deduction in P is
defined as in N−=. The definitions of an E-part of a branch, an I-part of a branch, a
main branch and an E-main branch are the same for a branch in a deduction in N as
for a branch in a deduction in N−∃∨=.
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